John Carroll University

Carroll Collected
Economics & Finance

1980

Marginal Stockholders and Implied Tax Rates
LeRoy D. Brooks
John Carroll University, lbrooks@jcu.edu

Charles E. Edwards

Follow this and additional works at: http://collected.jcu.edu/econ_fin-facpub
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
Recommended Citation
Brooks, LeRoy D. and Edwards, Charles E., "Marginal Stockholders and Implied Tax Rates" (1980). Economics & Finance. 6.
http://collected.jcu.edu/econ_fin-facpub/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carroll Collected. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics & Finance by an
authorized administrator of Carroll Collected. For more information, please contact connell@jcu.edu.

616

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
MARGINAL STOCKHOLDERS AND IMPLIED TAX RATES
LeRoy D. Brooks and Charles E. Edwards*

In this REVIEW some years ago, Edwin Elton and
Martin Gruber (1970) used the concepts of market
equilibrium and differential tax rates between capital
gains and dividend income to structure a theoretical
model which they then used empirically to estimate
marginal stockholder tax rates. Their specification of
an equilibrium condition is appropriate for a security
seller who qualifies for preferential tax treatment of
capital gains. However, their assumption that such a
stockholder is the marginal stockholder in a market
equilibrium is questionable. This assumption, along
with disregard of transactions and other costs, is essential to their empirical derivation of stockholder tax
rates. This note presents an alternative explanation of
their empirical results.
The Elton and Gruber Model
As specified by Elton and Gruber (E & G), a stockholder is indifferent to the timing of his sale of shares if
his expected wealth is not affected by the transaction.
Indifference results when the net after-tax proceeds
from the sale of shares before they go ex-dividend
equals the combination of after-tax dividend and
after-tax stock sale proceeds obtained by not selling
the shares until the ex-dividend date. In this case,

the marginal sellers of stock qualify for long-term capital gains tax treatment.
In a rationalmarketthe fall in price on the ex-dividend
day should reflectthe value of dividendsvis-a-viscapital
gains to the marginalstockholders.Since dividendsand
capitalgainsare taxableat differentrates, the relativetax
rate on these two types of income affect the decision.
(E & G, 1970, p. 69)
The assertion that capital gains and dividends of the
marginal stockholder are taxed differentially is maintained in their empirical analysis to derive implied tax
rates. For the period covered by their empirical study,
they observe that t, is one half of to or 25%, whichever
is lower. From this assumption and (PB - PA)/D statistics, they empirically derive implied tax rates of the
marginal stockholder both for their entire sample and
for various dividend yield classes arranged by deciles.
Model Extensions

Unless entry into the market equilibrating process is
restricted, an assumption that the marginal stockholder has preferential long-term capital gains tax
treatment may be unsound. The "equilibrium" implied
by the assumed preferential tax treatment of capital
gains permits possible increases in wealth for nonpreferentially taxed investors. In a pre- to posttc (PA - PC)
PB - tc (PB - PC) = PA
(1) dividend-record-date-decision environment, long-term
+ D(1-to)
capital gains stockholders prefer a dollar of capital
where
gains to a dollar of dividends because of the differential
advantage of capital gains. Since investors lose a
tax
exstock
the
goes
PB = price on the day before
portion of their preferential long-term capital gains tax
dividend,
shield at the ex-dividend date, the statistic (PB PA = price of the stock on the ex-dividend day,
PA)/D is expected to be less than one if long-term
PC = price at which the stock was purchased,
gains sellers establish the market equilibrium
capital
=
rate
on
tax
gains,
capital
tc
in
equation (2), t, < to.
since,
to = tax rate on ordinary (dividend) income, and
long-term capital gains shareholders, ordiUnlike
D = amount of the dividend.
nary income (short-term capital gains) and tax free
Rearranging (1) they obtain
shareholders do not lose preferential tax shields when
to sell shares relative to the timing of
(2) making decisions
(PB- PA)/D = (1 - to)/(1 - tC)
the ex-dividend date. Ordinary income and tax free
from which the statistic (PB - PA)/D represents the shareholders are possible marginal entrants since they
ex-dividend pricing behavior which causes a stock- may increase their wealth under pricing conditions
holder with a particular set of tax rates tc and to to be which would otherwise result if only long-term capital
indifferent to the timing of the sale of stock.
gains shareholders entered the market equilibrating
Explicit in their model development and interpreta- process. Two principal classes of potential sellers are
tion of the statistic (PB - PA)/D is the assumption that now considered.1
Received for publication November 27, 1978. Revision accepted for publication January 7, 1980.
* University of South Carolina.

1 Other potential entrants might also impact upon the
equilibrium statistic (PB - PA)/D. The impact of potential
purchasers is considered in the appendix.

NOTES
Non-preferentially Taxed, Sunk-Cost Sellers

TABLE

The ordinary income or tax free (short- or longterm) seller for whom PC is also a sunk cost is very
similar to the long-term preferentially-taxed sunk-cost
seller postulated for equation (2) (for whom t, < t,).
The non-preferentially taxed seller, however, is one
whose transaction either has no tax effects (t, = to = 0)
or whose purchase of stock was not sufficiently remote
in time to qualify for preferential capital gains tax
treatment

(t, = t,). In a perfect market, with entry of

non-preferentially taxed sunk-cost stockholders, the
expected equilibrium statistic is
(PB - PA)/D = 1.
Since t, = to, the equilibrium

(3)
condition

in this case is

invariant to tax rates. Although the long-term capital
gains seller requires the pricing behavior (PB- PA)/D
< 1 for indifference, the non-preferentially taxed seller
may be expected to enter the market up to a point
where (PB - PA) = D. Thus, the pricing behavior
toward which the long-term capital gains seller is indifferent is not a matter of indifference to the nonpreferentially taxed seller.
For example,
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1.-POTENTIAL
GAIN IN WEALTH
ONE-DAY
NON-PREFERENTIALLY
TAXED SELLERSa

FOR

Annual
Dividend

Gain in Wealth as a Percentage
of Share Price

Yield

t0

1%
3
5
8
10
aWhere

=

0

to = 36.5%

.06%
.17

.03%
.11

.28
.45
.56

.18
.28
.35

column two is for a tax-free institution and column three is for an
ordinary income short-term shareholder.

trager, a (PB

-

PA) < D differential must be sufficient to

cover "in and out" transactions costs and tax effects.
If the equilibrium pricing behavior were as specified in
equation (2) with t, < to, the short-term arbitrager
potentially could obtain a gain, G, which must also
cover his opportunity costs of investment. Since t, = to
for a short-term buyer and seller, the required return
for entry is
G(1

0)PA(
tor)

-

+ D (1

-

tr)
to[PA(
to) - PB(1 + tr)

PB(1 + tr)]

(4)

let to = 36.5% and t, = 18.25%, which

where tr is the effective rate of transactions cost relacorrespond closely to the rates derived by E & G from tive to selling price per share. The cost
may be viewed
their empirically observed statistic (PB - PA)/D = as that which applies to an economic order
quantity,
.7767. In an E & G proposed equilibrium, equation (2), probably round lots, and may include both fixed and
a stock with PB = $40 and D = $.50 has in equilibrium variable components. Equation
(4) reduces to
PA = $39.61. A non-preferentially taxed shareholder,
tr (PB + PA) + G
PB
PA
having already decided to sell shares, must now deD
D
(5)
termine the more appropriate timing of sale. He can
Ordinary investors are unlikely to have sufficiently
either sell his shares at PB = $40 or wait to close out his
position the following day at PA = $39.61, thereby also low transactions costs to encourage their participation
obtaining D = $.50. By postponing sale one day, in the market equilibrating process. However, the powealth is increased by $. 11 per share for the tax free tential entry of "floor traders," who, as Exchange
institution or $.07 per share after taxes for the ordinary members, pay reduced brokerage commissions on
income short-term stockholder. The potential gain is purchases and sales on their own account, can not
greater at higher dividend yields, as illustrated in table easily be ruled out. Their transactions costs are near
1 under hypothetical E & G assumptions of equilib- zero, although they pay Federal and State transfer
taxes usually amounting to a few cents on shares they
rium conditions.
Since non-preferentially taxed sellers can increase sell. Their entry at the margin is consistent with an
their wealth under the E & G specified equilibrium of expected statistic (PB - PA)/D < 1 to cover any reequation (2), the specification for indifference based quired transactions and opportunity costs. Thus, an
on long-term capital gains sellers may not represent a empirical finding of (PB - PA)/D < 1 is not necessarily
final market equilibrium. Non-preferentially taxed a function of t, and t0, since, again, there is no differensellers entering the market can effect a new equilib- tial tax on capital gains versus ordinary income.
rium price, being willing to accept a lower PA relative
to PB, thereby displacing long-term sellers at the marImpact of Additional Entrants
gin.

Markets in reality may be less than perfect. A possible
set of conditions may be hypothesized to support
The Arbitrager
using the statistic (PB - PA)/D to derive estimates of
Another possible, and potentially very important, marginal stockholder tax rates. Sound estimates of tax
entrant into the equilibrating process is the arbitrager rates might be derived if non-preferentially taxed
seeking to profit from buying at PB and selling at PA sellers do not displace long-term sellers at the margin
while also receiving D. For entry of a short-term arbi- in a market equilibrating process. This might happen if
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1. non-preferentially taxed investors do not have an
adequate number of shares or capital to effect a
final equilibrium,
2. the expected return differential, (PA + D) - PB,
is insufficient to cover the associated costs of
entry,
3. the potential non-preferentially taxed entrants
are operating nonoptimally (inefficient or imperfect markets),
4. market or Exchange trading rules prohibit
sufficient entry of floor traders to materially affect equilibrium, or
5. by coincidence the costs of other classes of entrants, such as floor traders, result in the same

table 1) and are more likely to be deemed worthy of
pursuit under real-world conditions of less than perfect
knowledge. Thus, the likelihood and extent of nonpreferentially taxed sellers' entry is potentially greater
for high D/P stocks. Hence, the (PB - PA)/D statistic
may be larger for the higher D/P deciles because of
entry of non-preferentially taxed sellers,3 and not
necessarily from a tax-rate clientele effect of long-term
preferentially taxed sellers.
Conclusions

should be expected in equilibrium with rational nonpreferentially taxed sellers at the margin. E & G's
reported statistics for the higher D/P deciles approach
or exceed 1.0 (E & G, 1970, table 3). These results are
consistent with the expected entry by non-preferentially taxed investors.2 Perceived gains are potentially greater on higher yielding stocks (as shown in

E & G created an inventive approach to estimating
marginal stockholder tax rates. Unfortunately for
those who desire a convenient procedure, their estimating procedure is of doubtful accuracy. We would
have no reservations regarding use of their methodology for estimating tax rates if we were assured that
marginal sellers of all shares in a sample of stocks
going ex-dividend were long-term capital gains sellers.
However, if some displacement of long-term capital
gains sellers results, from entry of non-preferentially
taxed sellers at the margin for some stocks, the accuracy of their procedure is questionable. Furthermore,
if non-preferentially taxed holders were fully to displace long-term capital gains holders as sellers at the
margin, no inferences of tax rates can be made, as may
be seen in the equilibrium condition of equation (3).
A statistic (PB- PA)/D < 1 may reflect the influence
of a floor trader with transactions and opportunity
costs to be covered. If perchance the floor trader is the
determining influence at the margin, again no inferences can be made regarding tax rates.
The relationships determining the pricing statistic
are most likely more complex than postulated by E &
G. Only if potential entrants other than long-term capital gains sellers are fully excluded, which seems unlikely, can accurate statements be made regarding
marginal stockholder tax rates using E & G's methodology. Biased by the probable entry of others besides
long-term capital gains sellers into the market equilibrating process, their approach at best may only partially capture the effects of tax rate differentials between ordinary and long-term capital gains income.
It follows that E & G's summary statements on the
cost of retained earnings, stockholder tax-rate clientele effects, and market rationality of high tax bracket
shareholders should be viewed with considerable caution. Additionally, caution should be exercised in
using their methodology to estimate tax rates until
more conclusive evidence is obtained. Reliable estimates of marginal tax rates might better be obtained by

2 The equilibrium statistic for the non-preferentially taxed
sunk-cost seller is (PB - PA)/D = 1/(1 - tr) when transactions costs, tr, are considered. If, for example, tr = .01, the
equilibrium statistic for the seller is 1.01 rather than 1.0.

3 This perhaps is why E & G's calculated implied tax rates
that decrease substantially with increasing dividend yields are
not strongly supported by a recent study using a different
methodology (Lewellen et al., 1978).

equilibrium

pricing.

Transactions costs, as noted previously, are likely to
discourage entry of ordinary investors as arbitragers;
but floor traders whose transactions costs are minimal
may not be similarly discouraged unless their opportunity costs are high. Perhaps more importantly, nonpreferentially taxed sunk-cost sellers (including perhaps some large institutions) seem no more likely to be
excluded by the above conditions than long-term capital gains sellers. Some of the above conditions might
be influential in less than perfect markets, but probably
no more so for non-preferentially taxed sellers than for
long-term preferentially taxed sellers. The end result
may be a mixture of long- and short-term entrants into
the market equilibrating process.
Clientele Effects
In arranging their data by deciles according to dividend yields (D/P), E & G observed a generally increasing statistic (PB - PA)/D with increasing yields,
which they interpreted as evidence of a tax "clientele
effect." The higher the yield, the higher was the statistic, and the lower the implied tax bracket of the marginal stockholder, except for the two highest D/P deciles for which E & G reported indeterminate tax rates.
The increasing statistic perhaps partly reflects a
clientele effect. However, if entry of non-preferentially taxed sellers occurs, an alternative explanation for the increasing statistic is available. From
equation

(3), a statistic

(PB -

PA)/D

=1

is what

NOTES
sampling and direct examination of stockholders' tax
returns along with their stock purchase and sales activity.
APPENDIX
Equilibrium Statistics for Security Purchasers
For every seller there must be a buyer. A buyer's indifference to timing of share acquisition occurs when the after-tax
present values of the two decisions, whether at PB or PA, are
equivalent:
tC(n)[Pn(1 -

tr) -

P(1

FDFD+ +

tr) - PB(i + tr)]

~~~~~~n

H (1 +

ki)

i=l

+ D(1

tr)

Pn(

FD +

+ tr) =

PB(1

to) -

-

-

tc(n)[Pn(l

-

f1 (1 +

tr) -

PA(1

+

tr)]

ki)

(A-1)

PA(1 + tr)

where ki is an investor's after-tax risk adjusted discount rate
for period i, Pn is the expected share price at n, which is the
investor's expected holding time horizon, FD is the after-tax
present value of the dividend to time horizon n, and tc(n)is the
investor's expected tax rate for period n. Equation (A-1)
reduces to
PB -PA

iAt2

D

(1 + tr)(I

-

tc)

tc

=

tc(n)
_n

(1

the buyer's time horizon and anticipated future capital gains
tax rates.
If the market is restricted to long-term capital gains sellers
and buyers, the ordinary income tax rate, to, and the capital
gains rate, tc, can not be easily derived from the (PB - PA)/D
statistic if, as can be persuasively argued, the long-term purchaser impacts on the equilibrium statistic. Even with
simplifying assumptions of a constant required return, k, and
tc(n)= .5to, we can not assume that tc = .5to for an intended
long-term buyer. Because of the discounting effect, tc <.5tK
except perhaps for very short holdings. However, very short
holdings are likely to result in ordinary tax on capital gains.
Thus, estimates of to and tc in equation (A-2) can not be
conveniently derived by assuming tc = .5to. Extreme conditions can be specified with tc -O 0 as n oo or k - oc, and tc
.5to as n -O 0 or k -O 0.
Without additional information, derivation of accurate
point estimates of to from the statistic (PB - PA)/D is not
possible if the long-term purchaser of a security establishes
the equilibrium position. Additionally, if tc < .5t0, the E & G
estimate of tax rates is overstated. Displacement at the margin among long-term holders would tend toward shorter time
horizonholders, since (PB - PA)/D-* (1 - to)/(1 - tc) as tc
-*
.5to. This expectation is consistent with E & G's assumption that tc -* .5to and the long-term capital gain seller's
equilibrium condition, equation (2).
If the purchaser's intended holding period is short, resulting in ordinary income tax on capital gains and tc
to,
equation (A-2) reduces to 1/(1 + tr), which is approximately
equal to the short-term seller's equilibrium 1/(1 - tr) if tr is
small. Since this equilibrium condition is (PB - PA)/D = 1,
displacement of long-term holders seems likely.

(A-2)

where

+ ki)

i=1

Interpretation of the (PB - PA)/D statistic is thus impacted by
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PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY IN U.S. MANUFACTURING:
A LINEAR PROGRAMMING APPROACH
Henry T. Burley*
I.

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the linear
programming (LP) activity analysis approach developed from the Farrell (1957) efficiency system, and
thus investigate productive efficiency implications in
some recently published four factor aggregate U.S.
manufacturing data.
This approach, whilst it does not permit determination of statistical significance, has some advantages in
Received for publication May 15, 1978. Revision accepted
for publication November 5, 1979.
* La Trobe University.

that it does not require additive separability of factors
in the production function, or the stability of own or
cross price elasticities, and avoids some statistical estimation problems arising from multicollinearity in n
factor data. The LP approach yields interesting insights resulting from its solution value, optimal basis
and slacks. The analysis in the foregoing simple formulation, however, does not allow formal distinction between productivity increase and returns to scale effects; it simply deals with the one category-productive efficiency.
The data arise out of an earlier Berndt and Wood
(1975) study which estimates a translog cost function
relating total cost as determined by gross output P, and

